

## **Occupation Army:**

### **Institutional Culture and Successful U.S. Occupation Operations in WWII.**

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The successful post-World War II economic revitalization and political transformation of both Germany and Japan are virtually without precedent in the history of warfare. However, almost no agreement exists regarding the credit for these successes. The historiography assigns credit to a variety of factors ranging from the unique character of the German and Japanese people, to the brilliance of General MacArthur, to the magnanimous of the Marshall Plan. This paper will argue that one of the major reasons for the success of post-conflict operations after World War II was an institutional culture within the U.S. Army that recognized and accepted the absolute criticality of effective post-combat operations to strategic success. U.S. Army leaders understood that the measure of long-term battlefield success was the ability of the U.S. to shape a favorable post-conflict political environment, and that the army had a vital if not central role in that effort. This understanding was the result of eighty years of institutional experience in which post-conflict operations and related tasks were an accepted mission. The army's history helped foster a culture wherein leaders like Marshall, MacArthur, and Eisenhower placed priority, devoted robust resources, and conducted detailed planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan. .

The U.S. Army that entered World War II had a distinct culture, which the regular army officer corps most dramatically represented. The army's organizational culture evolved from several factors. The army's history was a strong influence on the culture. Also, the interpersonal

relationships between army officers and their mentors, friends, and family which ensured that the history was passed from generation to generation was a critical factor. Another factor that effected the culture was the professional education and operational experiences of army officers, particularly in the interwar years. Examining the careers of three key figures in World War II military occupation operations, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur, demonstrates how the components of institutional culture combined to contribute to the success of Army occupation operations in Germany and Japan during and after World War II.

Culture is a complex concept. It is one of the defining elements that sets man apart from other species on the planet. British anthropologist Edward B. Tylor proposed one of the first, and simplest definitions of culture in his 1871 book *Primitive Culture*. Tylor defined culture as “a complex whole including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capability or habit acquired by human beings as members of society.”<sup>1</sup> A more specific and comprehensive definition used by the GLOBE research study of the relationships between culture, leadership and organizations, defined culture as “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations and meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations.”<sup>2</sup> Many factors influence culture; one of the most basic is kinship. Kinship had a strong influence on culture of the regular army officer corps. Other factors which have a strong influence on culture are organizations.<sup>3</sup> The nature of the army as an organization in the years before, during the interwar year had a strong influence on the army’s culture. This nature was a product of the history, education, and

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<sup>1</sup> Marcel Denesi and Paul Perron, *Analyzing Cultures: An Introduction and Handbook* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Robert J. House, Paul J. Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter W. Dorfman, and Vipin Gupta, Editors, *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The Globe Study of 62 Societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publicatinos, 2004), 57.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of how culture is defined and how cultures can be organized see Denesi, 22-29.

missions of the organization. The living conditions, social and political atmosphere, and attitudes and priorities of the organizations members and leaders effected the conditions of kinship and the organization. Leaders, in particular set the tone, imposed their own values and assumptions, and were role models of the institutional culture.<sup>4</sup> In the case of the culture of the regular army officer corps that led the army in World War, the spheres of kinship and organizational army culture reinforced each other.

Kinship is a term which social anthropologist struggle to define. All generally agree that there is a biological component to kinship relations, but other factors relating to environmental relations should be included within the term kinship. The small core of regular army officers on active service in 1922 was limited to less than 12,000, and as the U.S. approached World War II active officers only numbered less than 15,000.<sup>5</sup> This group was a tight knit cadre of professionals with very strong personal ties to both each other and to the organization. West Point was central to the sense of community among army officers. Military sociologist Morris Janowitz in his classic study of the military profession, *The Professional Soldier*, noted that “the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession. They are the source of the pervasive...sense of fraternity which prevails among military men.”<sup>6</sup> Except for the period of mobilization for World War I when the army expanded greatly, the majority of officers entering

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<sup>4</sup> See Edgar H. Schein’s discussion of the interrelationship of leaders and culture in *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, Second Edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), 1, 211-253.

<sup>5</sup>Robert W. Stewart, Editor. *American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 59. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, 2003), 91.

<sup>6</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), 127.

the army between 1900 and 1939 were graduates of West Point.<sup>7</sup> Between 1900 and 1939 West Point contributed an average of 181 officers per year to the Army. The highest number of commissioning occurred in 1939 when 456 cadets were commissioned as second lieutenants, and the lowest number was in 1921 when 17 were commissioned. Assimilation into the army culture began at West Point which was a bonding experience for the professional officer. The Cadet became closely tied to his classmates; he also came to know the classes before and after him. The faculty had a strong influence on the cadets as well. In a four-year academy experience the West Pointer was likely share the experience with over 1200 other cadets.<sup>8</sup> From 1898 to 1940, two-thirds of all general officers of the regular army were commissioned through West Point.<sup>9</sup> Thus, West Point was represented the type of kinship relationships that the army fostered which occurred outside the traditional family.

Actual family kinship relations were also an important contributor to the strength of army culture. Janowitz noted that families in the pre-World War II military were “deeply involved in the transmission of military tradition.”<sup>10</sup> Of the graduating West Point cadets between 1900 and 1939, 26 percent were direct descendants (sons, grandsons, or both) of graduates.<sup>11</sup> Numerous other cadets married into army families. “A proper marriage by a young officer to the daughter of a high-ranking officer was a relevant step in building a career, and service wives worked hard

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<sup>7</sup> After World War I, Congress mandated that half of the officers retained on active duty in the expanded post-war army be from sources other than West Point. Stuart, 57.

<sup>8</sup> George W. Cullum, Charles N. Branham, Editor, *Biographical Register of the officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West point, New York* (United States: The Association of Graduates U.S. Military Academy, 1950), 76-1040.

<sup>9</sup> Richard C. Brown, *Social Attitudes of American Generals, 1898-1940* (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 34-35.

<sup>10</sup> Janowitz, 189.

<sup>11</sup> “Genealogical Succession,” extract from the 2005 *Register of Graduates and Former Cadets* (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, 2005), 9-26.

to screen potential candidates.”<sup>12</sup> An example of this is Lieutenant (later brigadier general) Harry Chamberlin (USMA 10). Chamberlin married Sally Garlington, daughter of General Ernst Garlington (USMA 76), niece of General J. Franklin Bell (USMA 76), and sister of then Lieutenant Creswell Garlington (USMA 10).<sup>13</sup> Though Chamberlin did not come from a military family, marriage integrated him into two of the most distinguished families in the army.

Kinship relations were important because they were an especially powerful vehicle for perpetuating attitudes regarding the army and its mission to subsequent generations of the regular army officer corps. In the era before mass entertainment, the passage of attitudes was done verbally through direct interpersonal interaction. Army officers in the 1920s and 1930s –like their predecessors, spent most of their professional and personal lives together. They lived together in very close and often isolated communities. They spent months and sometimes years together in remote parts of the world, on field exercises, or on missions. The isolation and forced interaction of the army officer began for cadets at West Point, but continued throughout the career of the regular officer. In these isolated settings, interaction included the sharing of life stories, was unavoidable. Numerous anecdotal evidence indicates that this was the case. General Hamilton Howze described how his father’s house at Fort Bliss after World War I was frequently visited by old comrades including General John Pershing and Colonel Billy Mitchell.<sup>14</sup> George Marshall’s house at Fort Benning was the location of late Friday night gin

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<sup>12</sup> Janowitz, 188.

<sup>13</sup> The Garlington family relationships are documented at *The Arlington National Cemetery website*, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/garling.htm> (accessed 1 March 2009).

<sup>14</sup> Hamilton H. Howze, *A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth-Century Army General* (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 9-18. Hamilton Hawkins Howze (USMA 1930) is himself also a great example of the interwar kinship relations: His father was General Robert Howze (USMA 1888), his mother’s father was General Hamilton Hawkins (attended but did not complete USMA, Civil War and S&A War veteran), his brother was Major General Robert L. Howze Jr. (USMA 1925), and he married the daughter of General Guy V. Henry (USMA 1898).

games and informal study groups that regularly included future army leaders Joseph Stillwell, Omar Bradley, Courtney Hodges, and J. Lawton Collins.<sup>15</sup> Through the informal interaction of kin, the life experiences and attitudes of the senior officers and the veterans passed to the juniors.

The major source of the cultural acceptance of occupation operations derived from the life experiences of the army's leaders, their friends and mentors, and their families. In short, it derived from the army's history. In the seventy-six years prior to 1941 every generation of American regular army officers had engaged in major military government occupation operations, or closely associated tasks. They passed these experiences on to subsequent generations of army officers who took ownership of them.<sup>16</sup> General Lucien Truscott recalled how as a young officer his commanders were a constant source of the army's history. One, Colonel George H. Morgan, winner of the Medal of Honor in action against the Apache in 1882, "was always entertaining us with tales of the frontier and the "Old Army." Another, Colonel Arthur Poillon, had served in a variety of military attaché positions and "shared his knowledge of both the early history of the regiment and of the area with all on many pleasant expeditions and picnics."<sup>17</sup> It was the rare regular officer in 1940 who was not aware of the army's history, and the occupations and large-scale civil-military operations that were part of the army's history. These operations began with the end of the American Civil War and the occupation of the former Confederate States.

From 1865 to 1877, as much as one-third of the operational strength of the Army was committed to occupation duty in the former Confederate states. Virtually all the Union army's

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<sup>15</sup> Omar Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York: Touchstone, 1984), 68; J. Lawton Collins, *Lightning Joe, An Autobiography* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), 51.

<sup>16</sup> Organizational Psychologist Edgar H. Schein indicates that stories about important events and people are one of the most important ways leaders pass on culture to subordinates. Schein, 251.

<sup>17</sup> Lucian Truscott, *The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917-1942* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 9, 63.

senior leaders: Generals Henry Halleck, Edward Canby, Oliver O. Howard, Philip Sheridan, John Pope, Gordon Meade, Winfield Hancock, and John Schofield, served in positions as a military governor. Many of the army's most promising junior leaders, including Adna Chaffee, Arthur MacArthur, and Nelson Miles, also served in the reconstruction of the South.

Reconstruction era army commanders were assigned a diverse and complex set of tasks: keeping the peace between races; integrating the Freedmen into society; rebuilding the South's economic infrastructure; and most importantly, reestablishing fair and just civil government. Towards this latter end, army commanders had to decide on suffrage criteria, supervise voter registration, supervise state constitutional assemblies, ensure and enforce free and secure voting, and then back up all these efforts and the constitutional decisions of elected state officials with force. They were also required to use force to support federal law enforcement in the face of an armed and organized insurgency known by various names but most infamously as the Ku Klux Klan. The commanders who accomplished these highly controversial and difficult tasks led the army into the twentieth century.<sup>18</sup>

Frontier service complimented the army's occupation efforts in the South. Though the frontier army was not engaged in formal occupation and military government duties, frontier service required many similar tasks of the army and its leaders. Army leaders were required to plan and support an economic infrastructure building program on a continental scale. Army units mapped hundreds of thousands of miles of unexplored territory; they identified, documented, and reported geological resources; they searched for, identified and mapped

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<sup>18</sup> A short analysis of the Army's experience in Reconstruction is Louis A. DiMarco, *Anatomy of a Failed Occupation: The U.S. Army in the Former Confederate States, 1865-1877* (Washington D.C.: Association of the U.S. Army, 2007). A more complete historical treatment is James E. Sefton, *The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). A good analysis of the army versus the Klan is found in J. Martinez, *Carpenters, Cavalry, and the Ku Klux Klan* (New York: Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007).

railroad routes; they installed thousands of miles of telegraph lines; they mapped overland roads; they guarded businesses such as the railroads, as well as settlements; and they occasionally policed violence between citizens.<sup>19</sup> The army's primary responsibility on the frontier was dealing with the American Indian tribes effected by, and displaced by westward expansion. The popular image of the army as the nation's violent enforcer of westward expansion is only one aspect of the army's relationship with the Indian. The army was significantly involved in creating Indian policy; advocating for Indian rights; protecting Indian reservations from white intrusion; studying and documenting their culture and language; negotiating with tribes and between tribes; feeding destitute tribes; advising economic policies; and assisting educational efforts. The army also recruited significant numbers of Indians into regular and auxiliary service.<sup>20</sup> This myriad of tasks, though they may have negatively impacted on the army's conventional warfighting ability, created an ethos in the army that the army was a tool of the government whose primary mission was to further the national policies of the United States whatever they may be.<sup>21</sup> Though the frontier was a poor training ground to prepare for conventional war, it was a superb school for future military governors and occupation administrators. The successful prosecution of the Spanish American War, as well as the Philippine War that followed, was largely the result of the tactically competent, highly skilled,

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<sup>19</sup> Two of the best sources to the army's exploration efforts in the West are Frank Schubert, *Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers In the Trans-Mississippi West, 1819-1879* (Washington D.C.: Office of the chief of Engineers, 1980), and William H. Goetzmann, *Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West* (New York, Vintage Books, 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Paul Hutton describes General Sheridan's enthusiastic support of the considerable work army officers did to understand Indian culture in *Phil Sheridan and His Army* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 254, 341-342.

<sup>21</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 1957), 229, 233.

creative, adaptive, and political attuned officers who graduated from the frontier service. The frontier veterans were the heart of the army through World War I.

Operations in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines created a generation of army officers who were as equally skilled at warfare as they were in colonial administration. Frontier officers such as Ewell Otis, Arthur MacArthur, Leonard Wood, Adna Chaffee, Franklin Bell, and Samuel Young led the operations and provided the vision and political savvy required for success.<sup>22</sup> Cuba and the Philippines in particular were the theaters in which the brilliant young officers who would lead the army in World War I and through the years up to World War II were educated and demonstrated their abilities. Young officers such as Peyton March, Enoch Crowder, John Pershing, Henry Allen, and Robert Bullard, among many others, all stood out from their peers in the complex occupation and insurgency environments that required brains, cultural awareness, combat leadership, political understanding, and most of all judgment.<sup>23</sup>

The World War I leadership who became masters of conventional warfare were the brilliant young officers who thrived in the complex and unorthodox operations in the Philippines and Cuba. The senior leaders of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), Generals Pershing, Bullard, Allen, Hunter Liggett, Joseph Dickman, Hanson Ely, and Preston Brown were all

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<sup>22</sup> The two best works that focus on the military government operations in the Philippines and Cuba are John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973) and David F. Healy, *The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902. Generals, Politicians, and the Search for Policy* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1863).

<sup>23</sup> Quality biographies have been published on all these men: Edward M. Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); David A. Lockmiller, *Enoch H. Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Studies, 1955); Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977); Allen R. Millet, *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); and Heath Twitchell, *Allen: Biography of an Army Officer, 1859-1930* (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974).

veterans of the Philippines.<sup>24</sup> Their influence dominated the army in the interwar years. The army passed their legacy on to the World War II generation of leaders during the interwar years through the professional education system, the missions that the army performed, and through personal and social interaction between generations of officers. The legacy that they passed was that the army was a multi-functional tool of the nation and many of the tasks required of it were not strictly military.

Although West Point was an important introduction to the culture of the army, its academic and military focus was rightfully on the knowledge and skills required of junior officers. Other than an introduction to international law, West Point gave little formal attention to occupation operations. In contrast, the army's two premier senior professional education institutions, the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and the War College in Washington, both devoted significant time to the issue of military government, occupation operations, and associated tasks.

At Leavenworth, the curriculum embedded the subject of military government and occupation operations in the law courses. The amount of time the curriculum devoted to law varied considerably over the interwar years.<sup>25</sup> Two areas of the law curriculum covered military government and occupation operations: military law and international law. Most of the instruction was in the form of lectures. The faculty at Leavenworth wrote and published two outstanding texts on the issue of military government. The faculty published the first, entitled *Military Government*, in 1920. This work covered the history of the occupation of Germany,

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<sup>24</sup> See Robert L. Bullard's work, *Fighting Generals: Illustrated Biographical Sketches of Seven Major Generals in World War I* (Ann Arbor, MI: J.W. Edwards, 1944), for a short but comprehensive biography of some of the lesser known key leaders of World War I who also reflected the military government experience.

<sup>25</sup> In 1920 the law portion of the School of the Line curriculum included 10 hours of lecture, 2 hours of conference and a 1 hour map problem. *Annual Report of the General Service Schools, 1920* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1920), 18;

and the history of the army's military government experiences in the Mexico.<sup>26</sup> In 1925, the General Service School press at Leavenworth issued another more comprehensive text entitled *Military Aid to the Civil Power*. The text was to "serve as a practical guide for officers of the Army of the United States in administering the Laws of War, and in the application of correct legal principles to situations involving Military Government, Martial Law, and Domestic Disturbances." Over a third of the text's 317 pages were devoted specifically to military government.<sup>27</sup> During the 1930s when the course was two years in length, students at Leavenworth also demonstrated a continued interest in the subject of military government in their individual research papers under the directed topic "Practical Problems in Military Government."<sup>28</sup>

The Army War College in Washington also addressed the issue of military government and occupation duties. At the War College the philosophy was that students learned to be senior staff officers and senior level commanders by doing. Therefore, students were assigned projects that focused on anticipated strategic level staff problems and worked on solutions in student committees.<sup>29</sup> The problems were coordinated to produce an overall war plan from the college. The work was linked to real potential adversaries who were designated by colors. Although the

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<sup>26</sup> H.A. Smith, *Military Government* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1920).

<sup>27</sup> *Military Aid to the Civil Power* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1925), iii.

<sup>28</sup> For example two papers that focused explicitly on issues confronting military government operations were Major Julian Cunningham's 1933 paper "Critical analysis of the methods and means adopted by the British forces in Mesopotamia, to control the civil population during the occupation of the region," online at [http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=574&CISOBX=1&REC=5](http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=574&CISOBX=1&REC=5) (accessed 24 June 2009); and Major Joseph N. Dalton's "Food supply for the civilian population in the American area during the military occupation of Germany by the armies of the allied and associated powers," written in 1934, online at [http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item\\_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=855&CISOBX=1&REC=6](http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll14&CISOPTR=855&CISOBX=1&REC=6) (accessed 24 June 2009).

<sup>29</sup> The committee system and the teaching philosophy at the War College are described by George S. Pappas, *Prudens Futuri: The US Army War College 1901-1967* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Association of the US Army War College, 1967), 41-45, 97.

War College academic exercises were not official plans, there was a close relationship between the Army General Staff and its War Plans Division and the work done at the College.<sup>30</sup>

Between 1926 and 1940 students in the G-1 Course of the War College worked on aspects of war planning focused on military government of occupied areas. The committee studies, though differently titled and focused on different color adversaries, followed a similar format. First, the students examined facts relating to the problem. This was an analysis of historical military occupation operations. The cases studied by the War College students included the German occupation of Belgium during World War I, the allied occupation of the Rhineland after World War I, and the U.S. occupations of Cuba, Vera Cruz, and Puerto Rico. The analysis included general conclusions drawn from the case studies and made recommendations to the War Department. The students then used the analysis of history to develop and propose a doctrinal manual to provide guidance to the War Department and Theater commanders regarding civil-affairs operations in occupied territory. Finally, the students prepared a plan for military government intended as component of a general theater operations plan.<sup>31</sup> This War College preparatory work indicates two important characteristics of the interwar army: the army's approach to educating future staff officers on war planning, and actual war planning was very comprehensive; and the army recognized the critical strategic requirement for detailed planning of military government and occupation operations.

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<sup>30</sup> The close relationship between the academic planning done at the War College and the actual war planning done in the General Staff War Plans Division is argued in Henry G. Gole, *The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934-1940* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003).

<sup>31</sup> See "Course at the Army War College 1934-1935, G-1, Preparation for War, 1<sup>st</sup> Part, Supplement No. 2 to Report of Committee No. 6. Subject: Military Government Civil Affairs," November 1, 1934; "Course at the Army War College 1936-1937. G-1, Report of Committee No. 4. Subject: Provost Marshall's General Plan, Military Government,," November 13, 1936; and "Course at the Army War College 1939-1940, Supplement No. 1 to Report of Committee No. 5. Subject: The Administration of Civil Affairs in occupied Alien Territory and Preparation of Manual for Conduct to Same," November 4, 1939 (Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA. Collection).

Some of the most important tasks that the army did in the interwar years reinforced the army's educational institutions attention to the occupation and military government missions. These tasks were not actual military government missions, but were the type of complex civil-military tasks that were not part of conventional war fighting, but common in military government missions. They included support to civil authorities controlling civilian populations. Riot duty was a major concern of the army and eruptions of labor and racial unrest were frequent enough to keep the mission in the thoughts of army leaders. The most famous of the disturbances was the dispersing of the war bonus marchers in Washington in 1932.<sup>32</sup> Riot duty was the most onerous of the army's peace-time domestic missions, but the economic depression of the 1930s caused the army to become closely involved with local government and the civilian population in other ways. One of the most important tasks the army performed in support of economic recovery was public works. The creation of public works projects and their supervision fell to the army Corps of Engineers.<sup>33</sup> The army also organized, administered, and supervised the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps. This organization recruited and employed over 300,000 civilians into a workforce organized along military lines and supervised by army officers and non-commissioned officers.<sup>34</sup> These diverse missions, riot control, economic infrastructure maintenance and construction, and labor management, were not military occupation missions, but they put army leaders in close contact with the concerns of the civil community and they reinforced the cultural notion that the army was not just a fighting force.

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<sup>32</sup> A complete discussion of the Army's role in civilian population control, as well as a detailed description of major civil disturbances is in Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997). A detailed discussion of the Bonus March events is on pages 367-390.

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Army Engineer Corps, *History of the U.S. Army Engineer Corps* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Officer, 1998), 51.

<sup>34</sup> Stuart, 63-64.

The diverse tasks encountered by the army in the interwar years made it plain that the army's mission was to perform whatever tasks were required in support of the interests of the national government.

During the interwar years the army not only engaged with domestic civil populations and governments, but it also engaged with civil populations and governments overseas. The interwar army's overseas deployments were primarily in Panama, the Philippines, and China. The missions of the army units in these areas were primarily defensive. However, peace time operations required that the commanders and other leaders in these locations closely coordinate their operations with the American diplomats responsible for the area, as well as with the indigenous government and the local population. This required that the army's leaders be politically engaged, culturally aware, and able to surmount the challenges of language.

Occupation operations and associated tasks were part of the Army experience in the interwar years. The army education system as well as peace time missions emphasized the importance of occupation operations and engagement with the civil community in unconventional ways. A large network of veteran leaders who had direct experience in occupation operations supplemented the interwar operational and educational requirements. The veterans of occupation operations were relatives, commanders, mentors, and role models for officers of the 1920s and 1930s. All the Chiefs of Staff of the Army until 1926 had direct experience in military government in the Philippines or Cuba.<sup>35</sup> Veterans passed on the understanding that conventional military operations were important, but not the only requirement of the army. Three officers who would play key roles in World War II occupation operations

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<sup>35</sup> William Gardner Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2005. Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army's Senior Officers* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005), 96-116.

were strongly influenced by their educational and operational experiences and their personal relationships with occupation operations veterans: George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur.

General George C. Marshall's education, military experience, and personal associations enabled his complete understanding of the challenges of post-combat operations and military government. In 1906 he was selected to attend the Infantry and Cavalry School of Application at Fort Leavenworth. Though he was the junior man in rank in his class of fifty-four students, he finished first in his class.<sup>36</sup> He excelled in the academic environment and qualified to stay for the second Staff School Year. In the second year the students took sixty-six days of instruction in law –half of it dealing with the law of war and martial law. All the students were directed to write individual research papers on the subject of military government. Students were all tested in foreign languages. All twenty-four students in the Staff College tested proficient in Spanish ,and therefore took either French or German. Marshall took the course in French.<sup>37</sup> Again, he finished first in his class and was invited to stay two additional years on the faculty. By the time Marshall left Leavenworth he had a thorough theoretical knowledge of military government operations.

Marshall's operational experience was diverse. Marshall was frequently involved with tasks and operational environments closely associated with military government and occupation. His first assignment as a lieutenant in the 13<sup>th</sup> Infantry in 1902 brought him to the Philippines. Lieutenant Marshall arrived in Company G of the regiment in May 1902, stationed initially on

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<sup>36</sup> *Annual Report of the Commandant U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, U.S. Signal School, and Army Staff College* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1907), 29-31.

<sup>37</sup> *Annual Report of the Commandant of the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kas.* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1908), 79-85

the island Mindoro. President Roosevelt declared the “insurrection” officially over on July 4, 1902. Though Marshall saw essentially no combat, he participated in many of the type of tasks typical of army’s role in pacifying and governing the islands: he saw soldiers acting as school teachers; he worked closely with clergy and other native leaders; he spent months in remote locations completely out of communication with higher command; and he dealt regularly with the challenges of confronting foreign languages, multiple foreign cultures, and tropical diseases. Because he felt he missed the war, Marshall later became a student of the war, studied the official army history, and on a subsequent tour, visited and walked the major battlefields.<sup>38</sup> Both through experience and study, Marshall had a thorough understanding of the army’s role in the pacification of the islands.

Marshall’s assignments in subsequent years were very different but no less challenging. In the 1924 the army assigned Marshall as the executive officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment in China. There he learned Chinese, and commanded the regiment as it protected American interests and property during frequent outbreaks of civil war.<sup>39</sup> Later, Marshall was tasked to support Civilian Conservation Corps and then work as an advisor to the National Guard. In 1936 he was promoted to Brigadier General and made the Chief of the Army War Plans Division on the army staff. He held that position until he was selected to be Chief of Staff and promoted to full General in September 1939.<sup>40</sup> Marshall’s rich assignment history not only put him in positions of great responsibility, it also placed him in the midst of diverse cultures, forced him to

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 120-144.

<sup>39</sup> Though officially the executive officer, Marshall commanded the regiment for several months in the absence of an assigned commander. He also was given a great deal of latitude to run the regiment in his last year in China. Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 228-245.

<sup>40</sup> Marshall’s military biography summarized in Bell, 124; Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General 1880-1939*, 271-291.

expand his language abilities, and caused him to conduct politically sensitive civil-military operations.

Marshall was an exceptionally gifted officer who excelled at whatever task assigned him. However, even an officer with brilliant qualifications required coaching, and assignment to the right positions to learn and move on to the next phase of his career. Marshall had to exceptional mentors who became his close friends: J. Franklin Bell and John J. Pershing. Marshall first came to General Bell's attention in 1907 when Bell was the Commandant at Leavenworth and Marshall graduated first in his class. Later in 1910, Marshall added to his reputation by running the division maneuvers in the Philippines during a time when Bell was the commander of the Philippine Division. The relationship between the two men was sealed in 1916 when Bell, serving as the Commander of the Division of the East chose Marshall to be his aide. As his aide, Marshall and Bell became close and Marshall and their professional relationship developed into a life-long personal friendship.<sup>41</sup> Long after General Bell had passed, the family connection remained strong as Bell's niece, Sally Chamberlin, served as Marshall's personal secretary through World War II.<sup>42</sup>

As the U.S. entered World War I, Bell released Marshall to join the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division staff as it was formed and deployed to France. During the war he impressed Pershing with his self-confidence and competence. As a result Pershing picked him as an aide as Pershing moved into the position of Chief of Staff of the Army. In four years of stressful, challenging and close service with Pershing, Marshall became one of his most trusted subordinates. The Chief of Staff,

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<sup>41</sup> Bell's experience on the frontier began in 1876 when he arrived in the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry as a replacement for casualties suffered in the Little Big Horn battle. Bland, *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, 159-160, 172, 181-182; Larry I. Bland, Editor, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume I. The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880 – June 1939* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Center, 1981), 98-99.

<sup>42</sup> Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 61.

occasionally joined his aide for informal dinners at Marshall's quarters and occasionally accompanied Marshall when he visited his mother who spent summers visiting Washington not far from army headquarters. In 1930 General Pershing was the best man at Marshall's wedding.<sup>43</sup> In subsequent years Pershing took care of his favorite subordinate. In 1938, Pershing helped Marshall gain a position on the General Staff. In 1939, Pershing took his recommendation of Marshall to President Roosevelt himself. On April 23, 1939, the President informed Marshall that he would be the new Chief of Staff.<sup>44</sup>

Marshall's close connects with both Bell and Pershing remained throughout the lives of the generals. Through those contacts, Marshall not only absorbed their Philippine experience, but also connected to the long history of the army on the frontier. Marshall's professional military education, his unique and challenging assignments and experiences, and most importantly, his close contacts with Generals Bell and Pershing, all connected him to the army's rich history of military government and occupation duties. Combined, they could not help but influence his views toward the army's occupation tasks at the end of World War II.

Perhaps Marshall's greatest decisions during World War II were those he made regarding the assignments of key personal. One of those important leaders that Marshall supported was Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower belongs to the generation of officers that matured after World War I. Though he graduated from West Point in 1915, because he did not see service overseas during war, Eisenhower did not have a strong wartime bond built with the preceding generation of officers. By 1922, Eisenhower's military assignments were singularly unimpressive. Two

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<sup>43</sup> Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993), 226-227, 268.

<sup>44</sup> Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume 1. The Soldierly Sprit, December 1880 – June 1939*, 712-713.

events occurred in the 1920s that created the conditions for Eisenhower, despite his lack of war experience, to distinguish himself from his peers.

The first event was when Eisenhower's friend George Patton introduced him to Brigadier General Fox Connor. Connor graduated from West Point in 1898 and as a young officer had served in the occupation of Cuba. During World War I he was Pershing's Chief of Operations for the American Expeditionary Forces, and was part of his inner circle of professional and personal confidants. Connor, who was on his way to command an infantry brigade in Panama, was impressed with Eisenhower, and despite significant resistance from the army, arranged for Eisenhower's assignment to his staff in 1922. Eisenhower and Connor became close friends. Connor took responsibility for Eisenhower's development as an officer, and for ensuring Eisenhower got the opportunity to demonstrate the talent Connor recognized. Eisenhower later recalled that of all the people he would eventually meet in his distinguished career, Connor was the "one more or less invisible figure to whom I owe an incalculable debt." Eisenhower's association with Connor connected him to the Pershing circle of world war veterans. After his assignment to Panama, Connor used his influence to get Eisenhower a coveted assignment to the Staff School at Leavenworth.<sup>45</sup>

Connor's help getting Eisenhower into Leavenworth in 1925 set up the conditions for Eisenhower to demonstrate his talent. Eisenhower demonstrated the outstanding intellect that Connor had recognized by graduating first in his Leavenworth class of 245.<sup>46</sup> His relationship with Fox Connor and his outstanding work at Leavenworth opened doors for Eisenhower. After

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<sup>45</sup> William B. Lee, *Major General Fox Connor, November 2, 1874 –October 13, 1951* (unpublished manuscript, at the Military History Institute Library, Carlisle, PA). Dwight Eisenhower, *At East: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1967), 178-182, 186, 198-200. See also Bell, 126.

<sup>46</sup> *Annual Report of the Commandant of the General Service School, 1925-1926* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: General Service Schools Press, 1926), 6.

Leavenworth, the army assigned Eisenhower to work personally with General Pershing on the Battle Monuments Commission in France.<sup>47</sup> Returning to Washington, Eisenhower was chosen to be a military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of War. He remained in this position until Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur picked him as an aide in 1933.

Eisenhower worked for MacArthur as his aide and military assistant for seven years – three in Washington and four in the Philippines. Eisenhower was fundamentally changed by the assignment. During his seven years association with MacArthur, Eisenhower was in the midst of national and international politics. He personally influenced army policy when MacArthur was Chief of Staff. During his time in the Philippines, he developed a close personal friendship with the President Quezon of the Philippines and was immersed in the strategic issues of Asia.

Eisenhower, because of long personal contact with MacArthur, was well acquainted with not only Douglas MacArthur's professional history, but Arthur MacArthur's as well.<sup>48</sup> In those seven years, he gained insights into the issues of national defense policy, domestic and foreign politics at the highest levels, and the seventy years of the MacArthur family's experience with occupation operations including Reconstruction, the frontier, the Philippines, and World War I.

Of the three key army leaders in World War II, Douglas MacArthur was the one who's education, career history, and mentor and family relationships most prepared him for assuming responsibility for military government and occupation duties after World War II. Immediately after graduation from West Point he was assigned as an Engineer officer in the Philippines working on infrastructure projects, and he developed texts on engineer and reconnaissance for the Philippine Constabulary. Soon after his tour in the Philippines, he joined his father, Major

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<sup>47</sup> Eisenhower, 204-210.

<sup>48</sup> Eisenhower, 196-243.

General Arthur MacArthur, as an aide for the period that the general served as an observer of the Russo-Japanese war. Returning to the United States, MacArthur served as an aide to President Theodore Roosevelt while he attended the Engineer School in Washington. While at Leavenworth in 1911 he obtained a temporary assignment to participate in the Panama Canal construction going on at that time. After Leavenworth, MacArthur was assigned to the General Staff in Washington under Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood and a former military governor in both Cuba and the Philippines. While working for General Wood, he was assigned to be Washington's representative with Brigadier General Frederick Funston during the American military occupation of the Mexican city of Vera Cruz. MacArthur remained on the General Staff until 1917 and the mobilization for World War I.<sup>49</sup>

During World War I he spent the entire war with the 42<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division; moving successively from the position of division chief of staff to brigade commander, and ultimately division commander. After the war, MacArthur served briefly with the post-war occupation forces in the Rhineland. Later, he returned to the Philippines as the commander of the Manila District. In 1935, he retired from the active army after serving as Chief of Staff of the Army, and appointed as special military advisor to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth. He held that position until called back to active service in 1941 as a Lieutenant General and commander of army forces in the Far East.<sup>50</sup> In his 38 years of service prior to World War II MacArthur was directly involved in occupation operations twice, and served in numerous command positions were civil-military relations, both domestic and foreign, were a key requirement of the position.

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<sup>49</sup> MacArthur, 42-56.

<sup>50</sup> MacArthur, 34-125; Bell, 120;

MacArthur, more than either Marshall or Eisenhower, was the beneficiary of a strong system of mentors, particularly during the crucial early part of his career. The most important of these was his father. Arthur MacArthur was a Medal of Honor winner in the Civil War; participated in Reconstruction duty in Louisiana (where he met his wife and Douglas's mother); guarded railroad construction on the frontier; and was a division commander and then commander of all forces in the Philippines during the Philippine War from 1898 to 1901. He was also the military governor of the islands. Most analysts, then and now, give MacArthur the bulk of the credit for the successful pacification of the islands.<sup>51</sup> Douglas MacArthur was very close to his father, who was his role model. He was very aware of his father's history and hoped to emulate him as much as possible.

Douglas MacArthur, like Eisenhower and Marshall, anticipated the occupation mission as part of the normal development of operations in World War II. His acceptance of the mission was not so much a deliberate decision but rather an unconscious assumption that was a function of his formal military education, his experiences as an army officer, and the history of the army and his family with occupation missions and associated tasks.

Japan emerged from occupation status officially on April 28, 1952. West Germany regained its sovereignty as the Federal Republic of Germany on May 5, 1955.<sup>52</sup> There is no doubt that the decades since World War II have proven that Germany and Japan are genuine stable democracies. Both countries have also grown into world economic powerhouses. Based on these broad unchallenged outcomes, the occupation of both countries was a success.

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<sup>51</sup> See the analysis of Brian Linn in *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), and John Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*.

<sup>52</sup> Most of West German sovereignty was restored in May 1945 when the military governors of the three western allies were replaced by civilian high commissioners. True sovereignty to a united Germany did not occur until the reunification of Germany in October, 1990.

However, the reason for that success is less clear. Some historians believe that in the case of Japan, much of the credit goes to the unique brilliance of Douglas MacArthur. Historian of the occupation of Japan, Michael Harvey declared “he bore the stamp of greatness. He was the last American hero.”<sup>53</sup> Other historians believe that Germany and Japan essentially made their own way in the post-war world. Some historians contend, if anything, the U.S. Army may have hindered a more rapid and more effective movement to democracy and economic prosperity.<sup>54</sup>

Unremarked by many is the army’s role in the success of the occupations. The resources, planning, leadership, and operations of the army in occupied Japan and Germany were essential for success. Even the act of getting out of the way of the Germans and Japanese at the appropriate time was a requirement consciously recognized by the army and influenced by the institution’s long experience with occupation operations. General MacArthur, speaking for himself in reflecting on the occupation of Japan could have been speaking for the U.S. Army as an institution. In his memoirs MacArthur states:

Military occupation was not new to me. I had garrisoned the west bank of the Rhine as commander of the Rainbow Division at the end of World War I.... History teaches, too, that almost every military occupation breeds new wars of the future. I had studied the lives of Alexander and Caesar and Napoleon, and great as these captains were, all had erred when they became the leaders of occupation forces. I tried to remember lessons my own father had taught me, lessons learned out of his experience as military governor of the Philippines....<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Robert Harvey, *American Shogun: General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito, and the Drama of Modern Japan*. (New York: Overlook, 2006), 459. Numerous other histories echo Harvey’s general point including Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

<sup>54</sup> This is the thesis of Edward N. Peterson, *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to victory* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1977). It is also an idea central to John Gimbles two books: *A German Community Under American Occupation* (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1961) and *The American Occupation of Germany : Politics and the Military, 1945-1949* (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1968). Though not the author’s conclusion, this view is also addressed in relation to Japan in Finn, 315.

<sup>55</sup> MacArthur, 323.

Military occupations were not new to the U.S. Army. The army's history over the seventy-five years prior to World War II was full of occupation missions and tasks associated with occupation missions. Many of the senior leaders participated in the occupation after World War I or were involved with civil-military tasks in the interwar years. The army studied the history of occupations. The professional military education system included occupation operations in the curriculum of the elite military schools. Finally, the close-knit personal relationships that existed between generations of the regular army officer corps ensured the passing of the full and diverse experience of occupation operations, beginning with Reconstruction after Civil War, to subsequent generations. Thus, the occupation mission was integral to the institutional culture of the U.S. Army, and that cultural understanding of the mission was one of the major reasons for the success of post-conflict operations after World War II.