Moroland, 1899-1906. *America's First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society*, by Robert A. Fulton (Bend, OR: Tumalo Creek Press, 2007), 417.

*Moroland* by Robert A. Fulton is a comprehensive examination of American policy toward and military operations against the Moros of the southern Philippine Islands from 1899 to 1906. Fulton very effectively covers policies, politics, and military operations. What emerges from his work is a fascinating tale of brilliance and opportunities lost. It is a must read volume for anyone interested in a host of contemporary issues including counterinsurgency, clash of cultures, Islamic warrior societies, and nation-building.

Robert A. Fulton served in the Philippines as a Foreign Service officer in the early 1960s and has a firsthand knowledge of the islands and in particular the Muslim Moro population. He traveled extensively through the areas he writes about. He is now retired and this project is a work of passion on the part of the author. It is thoroughly researched, and though the notes could have been more detailed and extensive, it is very obvious that the author has mined all of the important primary sources.

Fulton’s chronological account begins as the Philippine War erupts in February 1899 and ends with the departure of Major General Leonard Wood from the command of the Mindanao and Sulu Military District, and governorship of the Moro Province. Fulton’s narrative focuses on the military district commanders and their major subordinates. At the district level he examines Generals John C. Bates, William Kobbe, George W. Davis, Samuel S. Sumner, and Leonard Wood. He also studies and analyzes the operations of key subordinates including John J. Pershing, Hugh L. Scott, and Robert L. Bullard.

Through his analysis of the individual commanders, Fulton highlights the two very different approaches taken toward interacting with the Philippine Moro tribes. One approach was the “hard war” approach represented by General Wood. The other approach was the “soft war” approach represented most dramatically by Captain Pershing and Major Scott. Fulton’s comparison of the two approaches creates tension and drama in the work and greatly enhances its readability. Fulton also highlights how the different American commanders accounted for the Moslem religion and the decentralized tribal culture in their approach to operations. This discussion makes the book’s relevance to current military operations readily apparent.

*Moroland* is a perfect follow-on to Brian Linn’s *The Philippine War*. Its only serious shortcoming is that it is an incomplete history. The U.S. Army’s engagement with the Moro Province tribes does not end in 1906 but rather continued to 1913. American policy dominance over the area continued to 1921. The reader is left wanting to hear the rest of the story. Fulton plans a follow-up book that will complete the history to 1913 and the end of military governance.

Overall, Robert Fulton’s *Moroland* is an informative, well-researched, and valuable contribution to the historiography of the U.S. military in the Philippines. The Moro campaigns are ignored in the histories of the Philippine War, but were an important formative experience for five different
Army Chiefs of Staff. Fulton fills an important gap in the history of the U.S. Army prior to World War I, while at the same time raising important considerations regarding contemporary military operations.