
John M. Gates is the Aileen Dunham Professor of History, Emeritus, at the College of Wooster. He received his Ph.D. in 1967 from Duke University and has written extensively regarding the irregular warfare, and the U.S. Army in the Philippines and Vietnam. School Books and Krags is a unique book because it was written in the midst of the Vietnam war by a civilian academic, but is devoid of anti-military rhetoric and instead focuses objectively on the issue of pacification strategy in the Philippines. Gates’ thesis is that the effective defeat of the Philippine insurrectos was the result of a dual strategy of effective and benevolent civil administration combined with a focused military effort.

Gates is at his best discussing the American strategy. He effectively describes how the two aspects of the dual strategy of attraction and chastisement complimented each other. The book begins with the efforts of General Otis, the first commander, who did not have the military strength to accomplish his mission, vague guidance from the President, and few intelligence sources. Otis did not understand the strategy of the Philippine revolutionaries led by Emilio Aguinaldo. None-the-less, the American army quickly defeated the Filipinos in the conventional phase of combat in 1899. Gates then details how General Arthur MacArthur wrestled with the challenge of devising and executing a strategy aimed at defeating the Filipinos who had reverted to a deliberate stratagem of guerrilla warfare. MacArthur aimed at separating the insurgents from the civil population and then defeating them. This strategy required close cooperation with William Howard Taft, the U.S. civil administrator in the islands, and pro-American Filipinos. The book concludes with an analysis of how the entire strategy was almost undone by MacArthur’s replacement, General Adna Chaffee, as the Army, according to Gates, over-reacted to the Balangiga massacre. This reaction included the brutal Samar pacification campaign under General Jacob H. Smith.

Gates’ work focuses on military strategy and thus does not delve into the details of tactics, politics, or personalities except as necessary to explain the logic of the American campaign. This is one of the few weaknesses in Gates’ work. For example, the book addresses the Balangiga massacre in a paragraph or two, and barely mentions the court-martial of General Smith, while other books devote almost an entire chapter to the incidents. Gates could have written a much more comprehensive evaluation of the war but it would have added a couple of hundred pages to the book. With the length of the book at 315 pages (including notes, index and bibliography), it is a very readable work.

Overall, John Gates very effectively uses official reports, personal letters of senior leaders, and an analysis of captured insurrectionist documentation, to describe clearly the American and Filipino strategies pursued between 1898 and 1902. His analysis is unique and informative, and makes an important contribution to literature of the American experience in the Philippines and to the history of irregular warfare in general. Schoolbooks and Krags is an important and essential work for any scholar or military
professional wanting to understand the U.S. experience with national-building, the Spanish American War, and counterinsurgency operations.

Louis A. DiMarco
LTC, USA (RET)